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Introduction
In the public debate about crime and violence in contemporary Costa Rica, statistics are the most explicitly or implicitly cited reference for the common thesis of the "rising crime wave." 1 Thus, the participants in the talk of crime throw around numbers which can differ widely, while the tendency always seems the same: things are getting worse and worse. At the same time, those citing these numbers rarely name their sources. Others simply proclaim that there is rising violence and crime without any statistical support for their statements, but in this case also the assumption of rising crime is implicitly based on numbers. The named or implied sta-1 I owe Rodolfo Calderón Umaña a debt of gratitude for providing me with a great deal of advice and corrections regarding Costa Rican crime statistics and their realization. Huhn: Culture of Fear and Control in Costa Rica (I): Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement tistics are mostly used in a multidimensional generalized way. They are presented as an objective mirror of social reality, as valid for every kind of crime, and also as valid for the whole country. They usually differentiate neither between different groups of crimes nor different concrete locations. Finally, legitimate criticism of the statistics is rare. In this paper I will fill this gap and argue that an objective view of the Costa Rican crime statistics casts a different light on the talk of crime. 2 Newspaper articles are a good source for proving this type of generalization. A citation from an article written by then vice president and minister of justice Laura Chinchilla from August 2007 demonstrates the numbers game:
In recent years we have been witnesses to an alarming trend of increasing criminal violence.
[…] Between 1990 and 2006, for example, the total number of crimes per 100,000 citizens rose from 135 to 295, and some of them increased in an especially alarming way: in the case of robberies, which increased by 700 percent, and in the case of violations of narcotics law, where numbers increased by 280 percent. Violent crimes also experienced a significant increase; for instance, in the case of physical aggression, where the rate increased more than 100 percent. The same was true of intentional homicide, an excellent indicator for the level of violence in a country, where numbers increased by 50 percent in the same period. 3 (La Nación, August 19, 2007) These numbers have an enormous influence on the talk of crime. Even if the source remains undisclosed, the figures appear to be valid when cited by an important person on the one hand and based on the common perception that numbers don't lie on the other hand. Hardly anybody proves the validity of cited statistics or questions them theoretically. Once thrown into the discourse (and especially when this is done by trustworthy persons), they become "valid knowledge" (Jäger 2004: 149) . While the accuracy of statistics is in fact highly debatable, their immense influence on the talk of crime should not be underestimated. Interviews with Costa Rican citizens I undertook in 2006 revealed the power of these numbers and the good faith people had in them. Of approximately 30 interviewees with whom I conducted open interviews, each with a duration of approximately one hour, 23 stated that violence and crime are worse today than they have been previously (Huhn 2008a: 15; Rico 2006: 29-36 ). 4 2 Following Caldeira, by talk of crime I mean the dominant discourse about violence and crime as a social matter. Caldeira defines the talk of crime as the everyday discourses about crime as a permanent threatmediated in narratives, commentaries, conversations or even jokes-that "simultaneously make fear circulate and proliferate" (Caldeira 2000: 2) . 3 All Spanish and German citations have been translated by the author. 4 In order to obtain a representative opinion for the whole society, I interviewed males and females of different ages with different jobs, social backgrounds, and experiences in various locations throughout Costa Rica in November and December 2006. For example, I spoke to policemen, judges, prison wardens and guards, social workers, and NGO activists as well as to nurses, businessmen, domestic employees, priests, street vendors and pub owners. I thus spoke with people who deal with crime and violence professionally and with others who do not.
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They implicitly or explicitly explained their estimation using the crime statistics or, alternatively, statements they had heard about them. The proportion of those who actually read official crime statistics was negligible.
The first aim of this paper is the presentation and critical evaluation of Costa Rican criminal statistics. I do not discuss the statistics as a mirror of Costa Rican social reality but rather as a powerful premise in the talk of crime. I argue that the crime rates are used as a powerful weapon by those speakers on the talk of crime who should know how to read them but who obviously want to misrepresent the extent of the problem. I also prove that the problemperceived as gigantic and existing everywhere (Huhn 2008a )-might be far more relative and manageable than generally believed, at least in terms of its extent, its development, and its spatiality. I will first present and discuss Costa Rican crime-fighting efforts since the 1950s-as an important factor influencing the statistics and the visibility of crime and violence in societyand relate these to the crime statistics and the social perception of delinquency and violence in society. Some basic findings from criminological theory on the statistical measurement of delinquency serve as the paper's theoretical basis, which I outline in the following section.
What Are Crime Statistics (and What Are They Good For)?
The general academic criticisms of crime statistics are multifaceted (Muncie 1996; Muncie 2004; Maguire 2002; Maguire 2007; Schmidt 2005 ; and on Latin America Carrión/Espín 2009).
They range from a radical denegation of their usability to describe "reality" to a restrained review of particular indicators by those who work on advancing the statistics. While the amount of technical criticism and general skepticism is enormous and rich in detail, I will briefly concentrate on some central factors from both sides of the critical spectrum in order to subsequently ask which criticisms have to be applied in a relativization of the Costa Rican statistics and a critical reflection on their sense and use.
The main source of technical malfunctions in official crime statistics is the hidden figure of crime (Coleman/Moynihan 1996) . Especially from a historical perspective, the number of errors resulting from these figure is immense. The hidden figure describes the number of unreported (relative) or even undiscovered (absolute) cases. The absolute hidden figure consists of crimes which remain undiscovered. This may happen for many different reasons. A typical example is provided by robberies which remain undetected by the victims, who do not realize that they have been mugged. Another example is homicides which are not diagnosed by the physician who writes the death certificate. 5 In homicide statistics, therefore, homicides with weapons are generally overrepresented. A bullet in the head or a knife in the chest can simply not be overseen as easily. A third example is provided by cases in which a judge has 5 Criminologists consider the number of such cases to be very high. An analysis of homicides which were not recognized until a second autopsy revealed a crime suggests that nearly half of all homicides in Germany remain undiscovered (Brinkmann 1997). to find someone not guilty for want of evidence. Thus, even though it is possible that the crime happened in reality, from the point of the verdict on it will not have happened in terms of law and statistics. Already it becomes apparent that crime statistics do not measure reality per se. The absolute hidden field is generally estimated to be very extensive, through a measurement is by definition impossible.
The reasons for the relative hidden figure are multiple. Firstly, many cases are not reported, for several reasons. Some cases are considered trivial (such as small thefts), and in some cases the victims are afraid of revenge or are ashamed (as is often the case with sexual violence). Many people do not recognize crime, for example, children who do not know the law, and many people decide to take the law into their own hands. The latter is very common in relation to physical violence such as brawls. While a person who has been beaten can press charges against the offender, he will often prefer to fight back. Against this background, many assaults usually remain unreported. Crimes which are reported more than others are statistically more serious crimes, especially those where the victim has to report the crime to make a claim for insurance (Maguire 2007: 262; Muncie 2004: 16) . Therefore, a very high number of car accidents and thefts are reported in comparison to other kinds of crimes. The existence of insurance and the obligation to report a claim as a crime to the police also influences crime statistics. 6 Generally, changing norms and values influence crime rates, and thus awareness among society plays an important role. For example, the media extensively advocates social sensibility (Ricón/Rey 2009: 124; Rey 2005) . The so-called deviancy-amplification spiral describes the process by which people tend to report criminal acts that have been discussed in the media, which are presented as worse than they are and as socially unacceptable (Cohen 1972) . Over time, different kinds of offenses appear and disappear in public awareness. While there is a general sensibility about sexual violence or violence against children today, these offenses have been socially invisible for a long time. Sexual violence was long classified as private, and many violent acts against children were considered to be the personal concern of the parents.
Another example is youth crime, which has frequently alternated between being tolerated as youth attitude or condemned as criminal behavior (Muncie 2004: 18) .
These social changes in looking at crime apply to the self-perception of a person as a victim of a crime, too (Zedner 1997) . Whether a person sees him/herself as a victim and admits this publicly depends to a large part on public discourse and its historical change. Sexual violence is a good example. There have been times when many women did not interpret violence by their partners as a crime, but rather as "his good right," something nobody would care about or a relationship crisis instead of a felony. The same is true of many forms of physical violence and the victimization of children. The victim of a brawl often does not see him/herself as a crime victim, or at least does not report it, and an abused child often just doesn't know that violence 6 Furthermore, insurance fraud does so as well. As many insurance plans pay for damage caused by others but not by the owner, the number of persons who file charges against an unknown person to cover their own mistakes and claim insurance could be significant. 9 is "illegal" (Stanko 1988; Morgan 1988; Young 1988: 174) . This denial on the part of the victim may be a consequence of the dominant discourse. An example would be a judge who does not acknowledge the victim of rape as a victim by stating instead that he or she provoked the offender by wearing a certain kind of clothing or by saying something "capable of being misunderstood" (Sykes/Matza 1996) . Finally, changes in what the law counts as crime logically influence statistics (Muncie 2004: 17) . These are just some examples of the many factors that influence crime statistics, which are therefore not an objective mirror of "reality."
Another source of error-especially from a historical perspective-lies in the statistics themselves, and in the changing capacity to receive complaints, to translate them into a statistical unit, and to transform this into a national statistic.
First, the content of crime statistics changes over time. While these statistics were previously often very simple and summarized, today they are generally very detailed; however, at the same time some acts which used to be crimes are not today and vice versa. While marijuana possession was once legal in Germany, for example, it was later made illegal and extensively prosecuted then subsequently moderately tolerated again. This change in drug policy thus influences the statistics. At one time there was no statistical unit for marijuana abuse, then it became illegal and crime rates in this segment were rising. Today the abuse is again legal, but the statistical unit still exists. An uncritical reading of the statistic would imply that marijuana abuse has plummeted since the liberalization of the law in the 1990s. In this context, the decision regarding which source is the basis of an official crime statistic and which facets are indicators which might change over time. There will be a difference if the registered number of homicides committed is the official homicide rate or the number of victims.
Second, every crime that is reported requires a police officer to take the complaint. As Cremer-Schäfer (1998: 149) points out, crime statistics are "a redefinition of police and juridical activity reports," which document police work, not crimes committed. More police personnel, therefore, leads to higher crime rates, and fewer police personnel leads to lower crime rates. This is the case in pressing charges as well as in patrolling. The second phenomena became famous in Germany as the Lüchow-Dannenberg Syndrome (Nissen 2003: 121) . When the police presence in the village Lüchow Dannenberg was increased because-as an interim storage location for nuclear waste-the village became the center of protests against nuclear energy production, the number of registered contraventions of the law increased remarkably.
The number of delicts had not expanded; they were simply less likely to be overseen.
Third, those who handle crime statistics need to do so consistently and need to be technically able to do so. Older Costa Rican crime statistics lead to the assumption that some police posts simply did not hand in their statistics or did not register their work for several years. Otherwise there is no explanation for why in some years there are no registered crimes at all in certain districts. Thus the reliability of crime statistics depends on the capacity to register crime and to merge these registered crimes into nationwide statistics together with the probability of not making mistakes in doing so, something which is technically developed through the use of computers instead of typewriters, through simpler data transfer technologies or through advanced statistical software.
Finally, I have already mentioned another point related to technical ability: the advances in crime investigation techniques. While more crimes may have remained undiscovered for technical reasons in the past, today forensics, data collection, high-tech crime scene investigations and so on are helping to increase the bright figure (which is the opposite of hidden figure).
While crime statistics are generally very unreliable, and were even more unreliable in the past, and while the historical comparability is particularly vague, they are usually presented as an unalterable, objective and timeless image of reality. Nevertheless, as Young states, To base criminological theory, or social policy for that matter, on the majority of official figures is an exercise in "guesstimates", and tealeaf gazing. Meanwhile, various groups with special pleading regularity, and understandably, parade their "statistics" to show that their section of the community needs resources or that their agency has had such and such a success rate. (Young 1988: 164) As the other most commonly used statistical indicator of crime rates and their change over time, victim surveys should also be mentioned briefly. Implemented not least because of the problems with criminal statistics discussed above, victim surveys basically ask an empirically defined number of people if they have been the victim of a crime within a certain period and if they reported it to the police. As the range of topics and the complexity of victim surveys is today often very sophisticated, they may serve as a useful indicator for crime development and definitely supplement the weak data of crime statistics. At the same time, most of the criticisms of crime statistics presented here also hold for the surveys. Response behavior does not necessarily depend only on objective incidents; it can also be influenced by the talk of crime. As already stated, somebody who has been the victim of a crime firstly has to recognize this, secondly has to define it as a crime (instead of an annoying bagatelle, for example), and thirdly must be willing to tell. 7 In times when fear of crime is widespread and crime plays an important role in public discourse, this self-perception as a victim might be far more likely than in quiet times. At one moment vandalism in front gardens might be perceived as a more or less annoying practical joke; at other times it might be perceived as a case of youth crime.
In Costa Rica, the United Nations Development Programme has so far conducted two Encuestas Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana (National Surveys on Public Safety). The last and second of these victim surveys was undertaken in 2006. In addition to victimization, the surveys also cover fear of crime, public perceptions of Costa Rican law enforcement, questions related to personal protective actions, and the social behavior of the interviewees (see for example PNUD 2006: 553-559). As crime statistics are still by far the most cited reference to crime in Costa Rican public discourse, I will concentrate on them in this paper. In the following discussion I being by tracing Costa Rican law enforcement since the 1950s. As the visibility of crime and violence depend on the number of institutions and persons whose job it is to exhibit and count them, I will prove that Costa Rica has made huge progress in investigating and fighting crime, something which is clearly reflected in crime statistics.
The Development of the Security Sector
Despite the possibility that crime rates have constantly increased over the second half of the twentieth century and that crime may always have been a thorn in the side of Costa Rican society, another development during the second half of the twentieth century is very important: violence and crime have been investigated and fought to an increasing degree and have therefore become constantly more visible in society. As already stated, more police personnel unavoidably leads to higher crime rates, and fewer police personnel leads to lower crime rates. Furthermore, better technical equipment for both investigating crime and for recording it also logically leads to higher crime rates in the statistics. Therefore, a closer look at the development of the security sector is a necessary prerequisite to interpreting Costa Rican crime statistics, both generally and, especially, diachronically.
After the abolition of the armed forces in December 1948, Costa Rica established a police corps-the Guardia Civil-in 1949 to maintain public order. Until this date there had existed nothing like a professional police force in Costa Rica. In practice the former military was now renamed the Guardia Civil and was thus assigned a very different task. 8 It can be assumed that knowledge of police work was very limited at this time. It was not until 1964 that the Costa Rican state established a new academy to actually professionally train policemen. 9 In the interim, the former military school undertook this task. 10 This means that until the mid1960s Costa Rican policemen were basically trained and educated according to a military way of thinking and acting. Fighting a foreign enemy is a very different task than maintaining law and order inside a country, but it was not until the 1960s that military logic was replaced with the idea of an actual police logic. Additionally, the judiciary was reorganized after 1948.
The new government adopted a new penal code and a new law for criminal proceedings. In 1956 the judiciary became financially independent from the executive, with an annual budget of at least 6 percent of the of national budget (Poder Judicial: 5) .
In 1964 the government took the first steps towards improving the training and education of the country's jurists, and in 1981 these efforts were merged in the newly established Escuela Judicial (Law School), the mission of which was to "develop programs for the special qualification of judiciary personnel which allow them to strengthen their knowledge and conduct for the adequate handling of their tasks so that they can contribute to an efficient and compe-tent administration" (Poder Judicial: 21). In conclusion, the Costa Rican police and judiciary were both basically untrained, professionally speaking, in investigating and fighting crime in the 1950s and 1960s. The discovery of crimes and particularly the conviction of suspects was very difficult, subjective, and debatable as the police force was neither adequately trained nor technically equipped to work professionally. Without speculating about the actual number of crimes committed in Costa Rica and about the development of this rate, it is safe to say that from that point on more and more crimes would become visible and therefore "real" and also that new forms of crime would be identified, simply for the reason that it would be increasingly technically possible.
Over the decades following its foundation, the OIJ has become more and more specialized and structured. In 1992 it added a canine unit, which radically changed the investigation of In the 1980s the Fuerza Pública-the police force-became increasingly better equipped, not least as a result of the appearance of a new threat, the Nicaraguan contra war, and a newly invented crime, illegal migration. In 1983 the Ministry of Justice passed a resolution to monitor Costa Rica's borders and detect and avoid undocumented immigration (La Nación, March 10, 1983 ). While undocumented immigration was at that point not illegal per se, it was assumed that many undocumented migrants could be delinquents (La Nación, April 12, 1985) . Thus, in 1986 the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería (Immigration Act), the first general migration law, was adopted. It created a whole new catalog of crimes and made necessary the reinforcement of police equipment (Huhn 2005: 71- Since 1979, the categories have become increasingly diversified and more and more institutions have been contributing data.
While practically no one names the source being referred to when talking about crime figures in Costa Rican public discourse-for instance, in the media, in politics or in everyday talk-it is like to be the Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales or the Estadísticas Judiciales, because they are the only official sources. Therefore, I will discuss crime rates published in the Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales in the following. At first glance, it might seem contradictory that I first generally criticize criminal statistics only to use them as a basis for argumentation afterwards.
It is not. I will demonstrate below that the crime statistics do not serve as proof of the rising crime wave if taken as a significant indicator, if construed generally, and especially not if interpreted against the background of the findings from criminological theory on the statistical measurement of delinquency which I presented in Section 2.
Intentional Homicide
Homicide rates are generally the most cited indicator for crime and violence, especially when data are compared internationally or historically, because the definitions of and recording of this indicator are less inconsistent than in other cases. As the definitions and classifications have changed far less in this case then in all others, the numbers are also far more comparable over a long time period in terms of statistical logic. Therefore, I can describe this indicator for a longer period than I can the others.
According to the Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales, intentional homicide in Costa Rica increased from 4.5 to 8.11 cases per 100,000 inhabitants between 1979 and 2007 ( Figure 2) . Therefore, the directly readable rate increased by nearly 100 percent over 28 years.
On the basis of these figures it seems justified to state that there has been an increase of intentional homicides in Costa Rica. The absolute number of registered intentional homicides is as high than it ever was before. The rate appears to have increased very constantly, something which is especially noteworthy given that many people in Costa Rica frequently state that the problem arose quiet recently. There has been no obvious break in the constant rise. An abrupt rise in the figure could have supported the assumption that there has been an apparent change in "real" homicide development.
Nevertheless, as there is a significant hidden figure in homicide, the curve progression has to be challenged at least slightly on the basis of modern criminology. As I have already noted, the hidden figure of homicide logically changes with the progression of forensic and legal medical technology. As both have advanced very intensively, it can be assumed that the hid-den figure has decreased. In this case, intentional homicide rates were always higher, though the percentage of those which were recorded in the statistics used to be lower. It is safe to say that the hidden figure was most likely higher in 1979 than in 2007. Other scientifically verifiable factors include the increase in the number of law enforcement agency personnel over the same period and the decline in technical errors in the collection of data (for instance, through the use of networked computers today instead of pencils and typewriters). These factors have probably also resulted in higher rates of discovered and recorded intentional homicide. 
Theft
Another frequently discussed form of crime is theft, which is often mixed up with homicides in the talk of crime. "They kill you for a mobile phone" or "our lives are worth a mobile phone" are oft-heard phrases (for example La Nación, November 30, 2007).
According to the Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales, the number of thefts increased from 400 to 517 cases per 100,000 inhabitants between 1995 and 2007 ( Figure 3 ). ure. Secondly, the increased social sensibility may have strengthened many people's selfperception as victims of a crime which they must report to the police. According to criminological theory, these processes have with the utmost probability reduced the hidden figure, thus making the curve progression potentially less steep in reality.
The Anuarios de Estadísticas Policiales differentiates between theft involving the use of force against objects and theft involving violence against people. The first category includes cases such as burglary and housebreaking. The second category includes robberies and muggings.
The numbers for both differ remarkably, something which is important for the evaluation of fear of crime. Between 1995 and 2007 the number of thefts involving the use of force against objects increased from a rate of 313 registered cases per 100,000 inhabitants to 338 (Figure 4 ). The number of thefts involving violence against people increased from a rate of 88 registered cases per 100,000 inhabitants to 179 ( Figure 5 ). implies, nor do they unreservedly confirm the everything-used-to-be-better argument.
Violations of Narcotics Law
Violations of narcotics law, such as drug trafficking, drug abuse, and drug dealing, are another frequent topic in the talk of crime. The public perception is that these delicts have in- Leaving aside all theoretical criticisms regarding the "truth value" of these numbers, Figure 6 indicates at first glance that there was a peak Figure 6 and Chinchilla's statement are a perfect example of the misuse of crime statistics in the current talk of crime. Firstly, it is easy to intentionally misinterpret the statistics. Secondly, the public proclamation of rather doubtful numbers in the knowledge that people will just believe them (as it is highly accepted that numbers do not lie) and can hardly prove them wrong is typical of the dominant discourse.
On the basis of criminological theory it has to be stated that the figures once again do not mirror social reality in Costa Rica. As state efforts to investigate and fight drug crimes are constantly expanding-together with the crime sensibility in society and therefore probably also the number of charges pressed-the rate of violations of narcotics law should also be increasing continuously. In order to explain the decline in the rate during times of extended alertness, a look at narcotics law could provide initial clues, as could the possibility of a paradigm shift in drug-fighting policies or possible changes in data collection. In spite of all criticism and on the basis of Caldeira's premise that statistics can at least be used to detect tendencies, it can be assumed that no obvious, alarming trend of an increase in violations of narcotics law can be derived from crime statistics. 
All Recorded Complaints
Finally, I will display changes in the curve progression for all complaints recorded by the OIJ. Once again, the validity of these figures for describing Costa Rican reality is limited in multiple ways. Nevertheless, given the fact that more police personnel in more police stations should be able to record more cases and that the increasing fear of crime and the current social sensibility should lead to more complaints, Figure 8 can hardly be cited as evidence of the alarming trend of an increase of crime. 
Crime Scenes
In the generalizing talk of crime, the entire country is perceived as a permanent crime scene.
If the statistics can point to tendencies, as Caldeira states, a look at the concrete locations of delinquency can help to determine if crime is a nationwide phenomenon. The informative value of crime statistics with respect to the geography of delinquency remains highly vague in any case. Nevertheless, a critical look at the geographical distribution can help to specify the information on the phenomenon as a precondition for a more objective public discussion of violence and crime in Costa Rica. As geographical differentiations are very extensive, I will look at this issue only briefly, using the example of intentional homicide, to demonstrate the general value of a closer inspection (see also Rico 2006: 20-21) . Table 1 shows the distribution of all recorded intentional homicides in the seven Costa Rican provinces in 2007. Leaving aside the possibility of different capacities for detecting, investigating and solving cases of intentional homicide in the single provinces, and the resulting differences in hidden figures, Table 1 indicates that there is a likelihood of an uneven geographical distribution of intentional homicides. It appears that the majority of homicides in the period depicted took place in the province of San José, while the rate (homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) was highest in the province of Limón. An objective public discussion of crime in Costa Rica should take these geographical differences into account. While the talk of crime in Costa Rica remains very vague in terms of the localization of risks, statistics suggest that there are some concrete locations with higher crime rates. Table 2 shows the distribution of all recorded intentional homicides in four districts of the province of San José between 1990 and 2004.
The table shows that the majority of intentional homicides in the province of San José always took place in the city of San José. In 2004 the number of homicides in the city was followed by the districts of Desamparados, Goicoechea, and Tibás respectively.
Without further discussing geographical differences in crime, Tables 1 and 2 A closer look could possibly identify socioeconomic reasons for different crime rates in different locations, or for other regional problems, such as a complex connection between cities and delinquency. 16 If an intention of the talk of crime was also to calm fears, inhabitants of many concrete locations could breathe a sigh of relief if the locations of delinquency were more specifically identified. Furthermore, measures for preventing delinquency could be far more effective. Instead, however, the talk of crime-represented in the media, in politicians' speeches, in laws, and in everyday life-implies that there is a national problem which is getting worse and worse and that therefore an enhancement of law and order is necessary everywhere. 
The Myth of Impunity
As I am already talking about statistics, I will also present a statistic which probably has no hidden figure. A constantly repeated argument in the talk of crime is the accusation that the state is not tough enough on criminals. "They can rob or even kill someone and get arrested, and they are back on the streets the next day anyway," is an oft-expressed opinion (see for example La Nación, September 6, 2007) . While this accusation has existed at least since the 1950s (Huhn 2009 ) and while the penalties for many criminal acts have been stiffened in the last decades-for instance, the raising of the maximum prison penalty from 25 to 50 years in 1994 (Asamblea Legislativa 1994b) or the maximum prison sentence for adolescents, which is one of the highest worldwide (Peetz 2008: 27) as an irrevocable disproval of the common thesis of weak legal actions, but it at least suggests that this assumption is questionable.
On the Relation of Recorded and Represented Crimes
Finally, I will present a comparison, undertaken by the UNDP, of the vague crime statistics and the representation of delinquency in the media. The comparison clarifies a fourth fundamental disproportionality-in addition to the general misrepresentation of crime statistics, the blurring of the spatial distribution of delinquency, and the stereotype that there are not enough crime-fighting measures even though the state is continually reinforcing law and order-in the talk of crime. Table 3 shows the percentage of deaths from traffic accidents, thefts, drug-related crimes, and intentional homicides as well as the frequency with which they were reported on in all articles about delinquency between January 19 and February 1, 2004 in Costa Rican newspapers, as evaluated by the UNDP. While I do not consider any of the numbers and rates of crimes even roughly trustworthy, they might at least provide a small hint regarding the tendencies in social reality. Keeping this in consideration, Table 3 In Costa Rica the people inform themselves primarily with news from television and newspapers; they accept the "media reality" as the "reality of their personal environment," which means they do not consider the fact that the media presents a version of reality instead of reality itself. (PNUD 2006: 271) Murder obviously sells papers, but the permanent and generalizing media coverage also scares people and affects the dominant discourse. As a consequence, it also affects the social order in Costa Rica. The common knowledge that the "life of every Costa Rican is worth a mobile phone" is not least the result of irresponsible and improportionate media coverage of crime. Additionally, in Costa Rica articles on crime have moved from the juridical or police pages to the political and, in particular, front pages of newspapers, a trend which Ricón and
Rey have detected across the whole Latin American continent (2009: 122).
Conclusions
The analysis of Costa Rican crime statistics can be summarized as follows : 1) In general, crime rates have not exploded in the last 20 years. In the case of some delicts, figures have increased continuously; in other cases they have reached a peak and then decreased afterwards. Nevertheless, the figures for some kinds of crimes have generally increased and are not insignificant.
2) Crime statistics also display a noticeable spatial concentration of delinquency. I have exemplified this for the case of intentional homicide, where the cities and especially San José are the hot spots, followed in turn by particular districts. While the dominant discourse presents the whole country as a permanent crime scene, a closer look at the "real" locations of high crime rates can possibly identify the reasons behind the crimes as well as potential groups of victims and thereby reduce the fear of crime.
3) Crime statistics can also document state crime-fighting measures. I exemplified this using the case of the OIJ personnel and the development of the number of prisoners in Costa Rica. It is not my intention to justify the escalation of the fight against crime and the enforcement of law and order, either from a scientific or a political point of view. Nevertheless, the figures show that the continually repeated accusation that the Costa Rican government is not doing enough to fight crime cannot be supported without reservation.
4) Finally, the crime rates are disproportionate to the representation of crime in dominant discourse. The media particularly spotlights violent crimes, the number of which, among all investigated crimes, is rather small. As media coverage is normally perceived as a mirror of reality, the overrepresentation of violent crimes fuels the fear of crime in the sense of the expression that "the life of a Costa Rican is today worth a mobile phone."
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In a paper about crime statistics, the historian Herbert Reinke tells the story of a conflict regarding national crime statistics in Great Britain in the 1890s. A group of experts was instructed to finally clarify the question of whether there was a "crime wave" in the country according to the statistics. Afterwards, a state secretary from the Ministry of the Interior summarized the various conclusions which the experts had drawn from one and the same source.
One expert said "that crime is on the increase." The second said "that crime is on the decrease." The third authority stated "that crime is nearly stationary, about keeping pace with the growth in population" (Reinke 1991: 19) .
This anecdote can easily be applied to Costa Rican crime statistics. Some of the figures presented in this paper can indeed be read as evidence of increasing delinquency, as in the case of intentional homicide or theft involving violence against people. Others seem at first glance to prove the opposite: the rate of theft involving the use of force against objects, the rate of violations of narcotics law, or the general rate of criminal acts reported to the OIJ. In all cases, the remarkable efforts of the Costa Rican police in detecting, investigating, and solving crimes could be said to relativize the validity of the crime statistics. The figures presented on the OIJ's personnel and the number of prisoners could be said to underline the state's success in fighting crime. One could say that the number of intentional homicides has not grown that dramatically while the number of solved murder cases has.
Even if one tries to read Costa Rican criminal statistics as uncritically as possible, they still do not unrestrainedly sustain the continually proclaimed notion of an "explosion" of violence and crime made in the dominant discourse. A critical evaluation of the bare figures suggests that the continual citing of the statistically proven increase in violence and crime in Costa Rica has to be questioned and relativized in many ways. The numbers can be read as a slight increase or even as a possible stagnation in some cases, and against the background of criminology both of these are more plausible than the "explosion," which is hard to verify for most of the indicators, even if one tries very hard to prove a "crime wave" on the basis of the statistics.
Nevertheless, the point of view cited in the introduction is the dominant perception. Of the various huge increases in crime rates Chinchilla talks about, only the increase of intentional homicides can be affirmed with the statistics, though one still has to ask if the increase has really been that enormous. In all other cases, the statistics actually display a far lower increase than that proclaimed in the talk of crime, and in some cases even a decrease. Chinchilla could have cited the statistics to prove the achievements of the government, of which she was at the time the vice president, but she did not. Furthermore, she could have underlined the definite spatiality of delinquency in Costa Rica as well as undermined the accusation regarding the state's inactivity on the basis of the reinforcement of the security sector or the increasing number of convicted offenders. She could have debilitated the talk of crime instead of fueling it. A responsible demand by society for more objectivity in the talk of crime could help to weaken the trends of increasing demand for the iron fist; of spatial segregation; of the weakening of the state monopoly on violence through increasingly more private security measures; and, not (Scheerer 1978) . The more the media publishes stories about public insecurity, the more politicians react with law enforcement; reciprocally, the more politicians push the agenda of fighting violence and crime, the more the media covers these topics. According to Scheerer, media and politics thereby stimulate each other.
In accordance with the criminological theory presented in this paper, this circle of intensification can also be heightened by the crime rates themselves: the talk of crime leads to higher crime rates. The more the media reports on crime and politicians thus take action, the more delicts are detected. This, in turn, might lead the media to talk about a crime wave, which may cause society to demand law and order, which might dispose politicians to increasing actions and penalties once again. This never-ending cycle continues without even one closer look at the "real" rates of, locations of, facets of, or reasons for crime.
The Costa Rican talk of crime needs to be rationalized to a much greater degree. In summary, this paper is a request for dispassion in the Costa Rican talk of crime. This request is based on a rereading of crime statistics against the background of criminological science. As crime statistics do not satisfactorily answer the question of why the fear of crime is particularly peaking today, it is worthwhile to take a look at possible changes in the context of the talk of crime.
Firstly, there is a remarkable level of distrust in the political elite, which makes it harder for politicians or parties to enforce unpopular political programs which do not follow the talk of crime themselves. Theoretically, it may be that it is getting harder to dispute "governing through crime" (Simon 2007 ) once it has been implemented. If such policies are implemented, fear of crime needs to be kept up in order to support the policies' existence. If crime fighting is the focal point of a government's program or a party's campaign promise, crime itself needs to maintain the people's main problem. Secondly, social uncertainty may have increased in contemporary Costa Rica in the context of cutbacks to the welfare state and the implementation of a neoliberal development model. While it is often stated that these social changes have modified crime trends themselves (in terms of increased need and desperation), I argue that they have also changed the way crime is perceived.
In the forthcoming and second part of the paper, I will therefore address two more fragments of the talk of crime: its historicity and its politicization. In the current discourse, the opinion that violence and crime have recently become a huge problem and that "everything used to be better" is hegemonic, while the moment the declared problem began is never named. The common belief is that just a few years ago the issue virtually did not exist, and that the further one looks back in history, the better things were. I have argued elsewhere that this perception relates to the specific and imagined national self-perception of Costa Rica as a nonviolent nation, an ideal which is mediated by collective memory and amnesia (Huhn 2008b; Huhn 2009 ). In the second part of this paper I will show that the perception that violence and crime are becoming a bigger problem each day has already prevailed for at least the last 60 
